State of U. P. Vs. Veerpal (2022) 6 SCC 7141

This Case Analysis is written by Nandini Vats, Third Year Law Student at UPES, Dehradun

Introduction

The case involves the State of U.P. appealing against a High Court decision that acquitted two accused (Veerpal and another) of murder charges. The victim was the daughter-in-law who suffered burns and subsequently died. Before her death, she gave two dying declarations: first to a police officer on December 20, 2011, where she stated that out of fear of her father-in-law, she locked herself in a room and committed suicide by pouring kerosene on herself; and a second declaration to a Magistrate/SDM on December 22, 2011, where she accused her in-laws of pouring kerosene on her and setting her on fire after a dispute over money.

The Trial Court convicted the accused of murder based on the second dying declaration, finding it more credible and supported by medical evidence. The High Court, however, acquitted the accused, questioning why a second dying declaration was recorded when one had already been taken, and suggesting the deceased might have committed suicide under pressure. The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the High Court’s decision, holding that the dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate was reliable and could form the sole basis for conviction even without corroboration. The Court also noted that the medical evidence supported the second declaration, as the burn pattern (injuries on the head and back but not on the chest) indicated someone else had poured kerosene on the victim rather than self-immolation.

Discussing the State of U.P. v. Veerpal case is crucial for understanding pressing issues at the intersection of criminal justice, gender violence, and evidentiary standards. This judgment significantly impacts how the legal system evaluates dying declarations, especially in cases of violence against women within domestic settings. This case establishes important precedents for ensuring justice for victims who cannot testify in court but whose final statements may be the only evidence against their offenders.

The Supreme Court’s careful analysis of multiple dying declarations and corroborating medical evidence provides essential guidance to lower courts in similar cases, potentially deterring domestic violence by strengthening accountability mechanisms. Moreover, the judgment reinforces the principle that technical inconsistencies should not overshadow substantial justice, particularly when vulnerable individuals face life-threatening situations that may impact their initial statements dating back to the common law principle of Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentiri (a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth).

Issues

There were four-fold issues derived from the facts in issue of this case:-

Whether a conviction can be solely based on a dying declaration without corroborative evidence?

What are the principles governing the acceptance of a dying declaration as evidence?

How should courts approach cases involving multiple and potentially contradictory dying declarations?

What weight should be given to a dying declaration recorded by a Magistrate versus one recorded by a police officer?

Rule

The Supreme Court’s analysis in this case relies on several key legal principles and precedents related to dying declarations under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (currently Sec 26 of BSA). Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deals with dying declarations and states that statements made by a person as to the cause of their death, or the circumstances leading to their death, are relevant in cases where the cause of that person’s death is in question.

Evidentiary Value of Dying Declarations: The Court reaffirmed the principle established in cases like Munnu Raja & Anr. v. State of M.P¹. and Paniben v. State of Gujarat ² that “there is neither a rule of law nor of prudence to the effect that a dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration.” If the Court is satisfied about the truthfulness and voluntary nature of a dying declaration, a conviction can be based solely on it without any additional corroborating evidence

Multiple Dying Declarations: Drawing from Jagbir Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi)³ the Court emphasized that the existence of multiple dying declarations does not automatically invalidate all of them. When confronted with multiple dying declarations, especially where the earlier one does not implicate the accused but a later one does, the court must carefully examine the entirety of the material and the circumstances surrounding each declaration. As stated in paragraph 32 of the Jagbir Singh case, each case must be decided on its specific facts.

Dying Declaration by Magistrate: Referring to Laxman v. State of Maharashtra⁴,the Court highlighted that a dying declaration recorded by a Magistrate carries greater weight as the Magistrate is considered a disinterested witness and a responsible officer. Unless there is evidence suggesting that the Magistrate had animus against the accused or interest in fabricating the declaration, such declarations should be given higher credibility.

Principles for Accepting Dying Declarations: The Court extensively quoted from the landmark decision in Kushal Rao v. State of Bombay⁵, which laid down six principles for accepting dying declarations without corroboration:

a). There is no absolute rule that a dying declaration must be corroborated to form the basis of conviction.
b). Each case must be determined on its own facts and circumstances.
c). A dying declaration is not inherently weaker evidence than other forms.
d). It must be judged in light of surrounding circumstances using standard principles for weighing evidence.
e). A declaration properly recorded by a competent Magistrate in question-answer format has higher value than one dependent on oral testimony.
f). Courts must consider factors like the deceased’s opportunity for observation, capacity to remember, consistency across multiple declarations, timeliness of the statement, and absence of tutoring.

Application

The Court noted that there were two dying declarations in this case – one recorded by a police officer on December 20, 2011, and another by a Magistrate/SDM on December 22, 2011. The High Court had rejected both declarations but for reasons that the Supreme Court found incorrect. The Court observed that what the police officer recorded was essentially a statement under Section 161 (Examination of witness by Police Officer) of the Criminal Procedure Code now Section 180 of the BNSS, which is why a Magistrate was later called to record a formal dying declaration. Nothing in the record suggested bias or malice on the part of the Magistrate, and even the High Court had not doubted the credibility of the Magistrate on grounds of malice. The reasoning given by the High Court for not relying on this declaration was found to be inappropriate. The Court examined the content of both declarations. In the declaration made by the Magistrate, the deceased specifically named the accused and stated that they poured kerosene on her and set her on fire during a dispute over money.

In contrast, in the earlier statement to the police officer, she had claimed that after her father-in-law tried to beat her, she locked herself in a room and set herself on fire out of anger. The Court found that the medical evidence did not support the version in the first declaration. If the deceased had indeed locked herself in and self-immolated, the injuries would have been different.

The medical evidence showed no injuries on the chest but injuries on the head and back, suggesting that someone had poured kerosene on her from behind. This analysis aligned with the version in the Magistrate’s declaration rather than the police officer’s record. The Court also identified logical inconsistencies in the defense version. If the deceased had locked herself in a room as stated in the first declaration, it was unexplained how the father-in-law was able to take her to the hospital, as there was no evidence of the door being broken or opened.

The Court noted that the SDM who recorded the dying declaration testified that the deceased was fully conscious and capable of comprehending questions. This was further supported by a certificate from the treating physician confirming the deceased’s consciousness while making the statement. The Court considered these independent witnesses’ testimonies as adding weight to the prosecution’s case.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court erred in acquitting the accused and restored the trial court’s conviction. The Court held that the dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate on December 22, 2011, was credible and reliable. This declaration, supported by medical evidence, was sufficient to convict the accused even without additional corroborative evidence. The High Court’s reasons for rejecting the Magistrate’s declaration were not legally sound. The inconsistencies between the two declarations were explainable, and the medical evidence substantiated the version in the Magistrate’s declaration.

The Court did not thoroughly address the significance of the two-day gap between the declarations. This time period might have allowed for potential external influence on the deceased’s second statement, a concern the High Court had raised but the Supreme Court dismissed without detailed analysis.

The Court’s emphasis on distinguishing between a “statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C.” and a “dying declaration” might be seen as overly technical, potentially elevating form over substance in evaluating the deceased’s statements. While the Court thoroughly explained why the second declaration should be believed, it devoted less attention to analyzing why the first declaration should be disbelieved beyond its inconsistency with medical evidence.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s acquittal, and restored the trial court’s judgment convicting the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The accused were sentenced to life imprisonment and fined Rs. 10,000 each, as originally ordered by the trial court. This case reinforces the significant weight that properly recorded dying declarations carry in the Indian criminal justice system and clarifies the approach courts should take when confronted with multiple, potentially contradictory dying declarations.

The judgment appropriately balances the need for caution in dealing with multiple dying declarations with the recognition that dying declarations often represent the only direct evidence in homicide cases. The Court’s detailed analysis of medical evidence in relation to the competing narratives demonstrates a commendable forensic approach that strengthens the reliability of the judgment.

However, the ruling leaves some questions unresolved. The Court did not provide detailed guidance on how much weight should be given to the timing of multiple declarations or how to assess potential external influences during intervals between declarations. Future cases may need to address these nuances, particularly in situations where the time gap between declarations is even longer or where there are more than two contradictory statements.

From a broader perspective, this judgment reinforces the special status of dying declarations in Indian evidence law—a status grounded in the principle that a person on the verge of death is unlikely to lie. While maintaining appropriate safeguards against unreliable declarations, the Court has ensured that this important evidentiary tool remains available to secure justice in cases where the victim’s voice might otherwise be silenced through their death.

Analysis

The Supreme Court’s decision in State of U.P. v. Veerpal & Anr. (2022) demonstrates a methodical approach to evaluating dying declarations, particularly when confronted with multiple, potentially contradictory statements. The Court’s reasoning can be analyzed through several key dimensions:

The Court’s reasoning established a clear hierarchy in the evidentiary value of different types of dying declarations. By distinguishing between the statement recorded by the police officer under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and the formal dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate, the Court reinforced the principle that Magisterial declarations carry greater weight. The Court relied on Laxman v. State of Maharashtra to emphasize that a Magistrate’s neutrality and official responsibility elevate the credibility of declarations they record.

This reasoning follows a consistent judicial tradition of placing greater trust in statements recorded by judicial officers rather than investigating authorities. In particular, the Court’s reasoning aligns with precedents set in Ravi Chander & Ors. v. State of Punjab ⁶and Harjit Kaur v. State of Punjab⁷, which established the superior evidentiary value of declarations recorded by Magistrates.

The Court’s emphasis on distinguishing between a “statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C” and a “dying declaration” might be seen as overly technical, potentially elevating form over substance in evaluating the deceased’s statements. While the Court thoroughly explained why the second declaration should be believed, it devoted less attention to analyzing why the first declaration should be disbelieved beyond its inconsistency with medical evidence.

Munnu Raja v. State of M.P., (1976) 3 SCC 104. ↩︎
Paniben v. State of Gujarat, (1992) 2 SCC 474. ↩︎
Jagbir Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 8 SCC 779. ↩︎
Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710. ↩︎
Kushal Rao v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 22. ↩︎
Ravi Chander v. State of Punjab, (1998) 9 SCC 303. ↩︎
Harjit Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1999) 6 SCC 545. ↩︎